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Before he was a lawyer, and after he became one, Charles Black was a
reader of the classics. As a student at the University of Texas in the 1930s,
he studied Greek and Latin and read the ancient authors. In later years he
reread them, with profit and delight, happy in their company as one is
happy with old friends.
I remember Charles telling me, not too long before he and Barbara
moved back to New York, that he'd been reading Homer again, as he did
every year, and found himself more moved than ever by the stately passion
of the poetry-a point he underscored by quoting a long passage in Greek
with his rich Texas drawl. Charles's own sense of style, his view of law,
with its emphasis on the architectural, even his estimate of human nature,
which combined warmth and generosity with a certain Olympian coolness
of judgment, were surely shaped by his engagement with the classics,
which remained for Charles his whole life a source of pleasure and
inspiration.
As a student of the classics, Charles understood the original Roman
meaning of the word "genius," a word that derives from the older Greek
word genos, meaning kind or type. In Latin, the word genius refers to the
specialness of a person or place, its distinctive presiding spirit, the thing
that makes it different from all others-its own unique self, which the
Romans sometimes thought of as a god, the resident divinity that gives a
person or place what we might call its special character.
There can be no doubt that Charles possessed a genius in this sense. In
an age of colorless conformity and deference to conventional taste, Charles
was one of a kind. He was a real character, in the exact and literal meaning
of that phrase, hovering between originality and eccentricity. I can still see
Charles, as vividly as I can see all of you, dressed in a pair of shorts and a
T-shirt for the Law School's annual five-mile run-called (what else?) the
Race Judicata-looking like all the other entrants except for the pipe that he
smoked from the start of the race to its finish, replenished from time to time
with tobacco that Charles carried in a pouch around his waist. I can see
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Charles in the faculty lounge, surrounded by a pile of 78s and a group of
truly amazed students, talking about Louis Armstrong with the same
appreciation with which he talked about John Marshall. And I can hear
Charles practicing his Icelandic-a language he took up late in life and
studied mostly by listening to records while he slept-in the main hallway
of the Yale Law School, oblivious to the stares of his uncomprehending
colleagues. Even on a faculty of vivid personalities, with more than their
fair share of quirks and eccentricities, Charles Black stood out as someone
very special. No one who spent five minutes with Charles could ever
confuse him with anyone else. He was unforgettably different, possessed of
that uniqueness of spirit the Romans called genius.
Today, the word genius means something more, or at least different,
than it meant for the Romans. The word has undergone an expansion of
meaning, first in philosophy and poetry, and now in the wider culture. For
us "genius" signifies, above all else, a tremendous surplus of creativity, a
superabundance of those human powers of observation and discovery that
we all possess, to some degree, but which in a few rare individuals reach a
level of potency whose effects are able, in an instant, to transform the way
we think and feel about the world, and which, like works of art, demand
attention and command respect, though for reasons we often do not
comprehend. Genius is the name we give to this mysterious wellspring of
creativity. Wherever it appears and whatever form its products take, genius
is a kind of artistry, and the original source of much that is beautiful and
true in the world of human culture.
Today, philosophically speaking, we are all democrats, whatever our
party affiliation. We all believe in the equal dignity of every human soul,
and in the moral imperative to respect this equality in our laws and
institutions. But we also believe in the power of genius, and revere it as the
highest expression of the spirit of individual creativity that is the moral
foundation of our democracy. Charles Black was a genius in this modern
sense as well as the ancient one. He possessed a power of creativity that
could be neither satisfied nor exhausted, a power that overflowed the cup of
all his works, of all his writing and painting and poetry, and in its presence
those who knew Charles felt the amazement and mystery one always feels
in the neighborhood of genius. Charles not only had a character, a
distinctive genius in the older Roman sense of the word. He also possessed
a great gift that set him apart from the rest of us, a gift that was, I suspect,
to Charles himself at times a burden as well as a joy. It was a gift of vision
and expression, a genius amazing to us all, beyond our power to imitate or
even fully understand.
To attempt to analyze Charles's gift, to dissect it into its component
parts, would be futile. Charles's genius can no more be defined than it can
be denied. Certainly intelligence was part of it. But the greater part, I think,
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was love-the great master passion the Greeks called eros, which according
to Plato is the source of our attachment to everything beautiful and good, in
this world and beyond. Charles possessed this passion to an exceptional
degree. He not only knew the law and understood it with the calm power of
reason. He loved the law, and his love for it carried his mind farther than a
mind can go by reason alone. Charles's judgments were passionate
judgments. His curiosities were passionate curiosities. His disagreements
were passionate disagreements. He was a man in love with the law and in
love with the world, and the more he thought about the world the deeper his
love for it grew.
Perhaps the most striking thing about Charles Black's love of the world
was his love of the people in it. It is possible to love the world but be
indifferent to people. Some geniuses are like that. But in Charles's case,
just the opposite was true. His love of the law, which is merely an
abstraction, began and ended with his love of the men and women for
whom the law exists. I do not mean that he found every man and woman
lovable. Of course he didn't. No one but a saint could, and I have my
doubts even about the saints. What I mean is that Charles found every
human being to be a subject of interest, a marvel even, worthy of
sympathetic attention. About other people Charles had the novelist's or
psychoanalyst's curiosity, and he saw in them-in each of them-the old
familiar tapestry of hopes and dreams and fears of which every human life
is compounded. He was, in this sense, a humanist, and his boundless
interest in the people around him sprang from an enlarged sympathy for
them, which in turn sprang from love.
Once, shortly after he had finished his book on capital punishment,
Charles said to me that procedural arbitrariness, which he had attacked so
powerfully in the book, was not the real heart of the matter. Can't we see,
he said, quoting a line from James Baldwin, that the sun goes down on us
all? And seeing that, he asked, his voice shaking with intensity, how can
some ever appropriate to themselves the lordly power to put others to
death? The heart of the matter, for Charles, was the denial of the human
community that includes the murderer too, a view which those whose
powers of imaginative sympathy are less than Charles's have found hard to
accept. Presented with legal elegance and great intellectual force, Charles's
plea for the abolition of capital punishment was at its core a brief for
sympathy, a plea for love, whose reality Charles could no more have denied
than he could have denied his whole experience of the world, which rested
on it.
Charles's lifelong encounter with the question of race was shaped by
love too. One might speculate that perhaps it was the other way around.
Perhaps it was his experience of the color line, while a young boy growing
up in Texas, that provided the nursery bed for that enlarged sympathy
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which marked the adult. Perhaps the injustice of segregation stung him into
love. Or perhaps he felt the sting, when others around him didn't, because
he was already predisposed to love-because he was already in love with
the world and the people in it. In the end, it makes little difference. What
matters is that his encounter with the question of race was driven by love,
which here, as elsewhere, permitted Charles to see things that others didn't
because he felt what they could not. Read again Charles's passionate attack
on Herbert Wechsler's neutral principles-a sharp debate between two
first-class minds. But Charles gets the better of the argument and his view is
the one that has prevailed. And that is because Charles never forgot the
people behind the principles, and he never forgot them because he loved
them intensely.
We don't often think of genius as a virtue in the law. Judges, lawyers,
and law professors need other, cooler qualities: judgment, caution, and the
disinterested sobriety we call fairness. These are, no doubt, law's everyday
virtues. Genius, by comparison, has an incendiary quality that causes us to
be, if anything, a little anxious when it enters the precincts of law. Genius
belongs in the realms of art and literature, which are always reckless and
experimental to a degree the law cannot afford to be.
But Charles Black's genius wasn't something foreign to the law. It
wasn't a threat to law's orderly existence. It was, in fact, much more like a
redemptive force, without which the law becomes hollow and pointless. For
Charles's humanism, his love of the human world and its inhabitants, his
passionate sympathy for our failings and ambitions, reminded us all of what
the law is finally for, and why it is worth caring about, let alone caring
about for a lifetime. This is surprisingly easy to forget. Once in a while we
need a genius like Charles Black to remind us of these things.
I say a genius "like" Charles Black, but that is already to speak of him
as a member of a group, an example of a type, when the truth is that Charles
was one of a kind. Charles was our genius, never to be forgotten, never to
be replaced, and his incandescent heart still lights the world, and will until
the sun goes down on us too. Thinking about Charles, in this solemn place,
on a winter afternoon when the world seems all asleep, I am reminded of
the words of the German poet Hr1lderlin who said of Socrates, a lover of the
world like Charles, "he who has thought most deeply loves that which is
most alive."' It might serve to describe the special genius of our beloved
and passionate friend.
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